In this study, I investigate whether auditors are a good external control mechanism to restrain management from intentionally increasing CEO compensation through earnings management. To examine this, I regress variations of CEO cash and total compensation on changes in auditors after controlling financial, stock market, industry and year variables. There are two sample periods. In the period 1993-2004, I examine the impacts of overall auditor changes and auditor changes that are classified by the audit failure or auditor brand names. In the period 2000-2004, I check the influences of auditor resignations and of auditor dismissals due to accounting disagreements.
persuade managers to adjust their accounting treatments.
This study investigates whether auditor changes affect auditors' willingness to allow managers to inflate earnings through discretionary accruals to increase compensation. To my knowledge, my study is the first to directly establish the relationship between CEO compensation and auditor changes.
In my study, I examine variations of CEO compensation based on changes in auditors after controlling influences of firm size, investment opportunity set, firm performance, firm risk, industries and years. My sample period is 1993-2004 (including years before the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the transition year for the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act) when I investigate impacts of overall auditor changes and auditor changes that are classified by the audit failure or brand names. This sample period is further limited to 2000-2004 when I check influences of auditor resignations and auditor dismissals due to accounting disagreements.
I identify a positive relationship between CEO cash compensation and the incidence of auditor changes. Further analysis suggests that this positive relationship comes from the auditor changes from big 5 auditors to non-big 5 auditors. These results indicate that due to a larger probability of facing the litigation exposure, big 5 auditors are stricter than non-big 5 auditors to restrain managers' opportunistic behaviors of overstating earnings. This argument is further supported by the empirical result that CEOs receive less total compensation after auditors are switched from non-big 5 auditors to big 5 auditors.
In summary, my findings present some evidences that auditors do not act as a good constraint to managerial discretion of increasing compensation through accounting choices. Auditors' monitoring ability is different across auditor brand names. This study is important because the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has changed the rule for auditor selection. Section 301 requires the audit committee to be "directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of the auditor". Consequently, auditors should be more independent and impose more weight on their monitoring role relative to other two roles. Auditors should have largely discouraged managers' behaviors of manipulating earnings and there should be no relation between CEO compensation and changes in audit information. Therefore, this study confirms the usefulness of Section 301, Sarbanes-Oxley Act by providing evidences that auditors are not so capable of performing their monitoring role before the issuance of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and the transition year of implementing SOX.
This study contributes to the compensation literature by bringing auditing information to predict CEO compensation. This study also contributes to the auditing literature by testing whether auditors function well as the external control mechanism to monitor management's opportunistic behaviors. My study especially benefits the literature of auditor changes by showing that compensation concern is one additional reason for managers to switch auditors.
The next section provides the review of compensation and auditing literature. Section III discusses the development of hypotheses. In section IV, I present the regression models. Section V illustrates the sample selection. Section VI offers an analysis of auditor changes along the sample years. In Section VII, I discuss the OLS regression results. I summarize and conclude in Section VIII.
Literature Review

Compensation and Accounting Earnings
The agency cost theory states that the utility functions of the principal and the agent are disparate (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . Thus if there is a conflict between the interests of shareholders and management, the inherent moral hazard problem occurs because management desires at maximizing their own welfare (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Holmstrom, 1979) . If executives' wealth is dependent on accounting earnings, executives are motivated to manipulate earnings to receive higher compensation (Gaver, Gaver, & Austin, 1995; Holthausen, Larcker, & Sloan, 1995; Gaver & Gaver, 1998; Balsam, 1998; Bergstresser & Philippon, 2004; etc.) .
Since compensation is tied to accounting gains but not losses (Gaver & Gaver, 1998) , executives are more likely to report positive earnings instead of negative earnings. They achieve this by overstating discretionary accruals because discretionary accruals, especially positive discretionary accruals, enhance the compensation level (Balsam, 1998) . Actually, accounting accruals have increased dramatically since 1980 (Bergstresser & Philippon, 2004) .
In addition, earnings management happens in contract settings where the benefits dominate the costs (Gaver et al., 1995; Balsam, 1998) . The conflict with auditors is one type of costs (Balsam, 1998) .
Auditor as the External Control Mechanism
conformity with GAAP. Thus auditors are ultimately responsible for financial statement users, especially shareholders, but not management (POB, 2003; Gibbins, Salterio, & Webb, 2001) . Since agency cost is used to monitor agent from impairing the welfare of the principal (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) , audit cost is one type of agency costs and auditors are one external control mechanism for management (Wallace, 1987) .
Previous studies have showed the relation between corporate governance, as the internal control mechanism, and executive compensation. In general, weaker corporate governance are associated with greater level of compensation (Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999) and compensation contracts emphasizing incentive compensation, especially accounting-based performance measures (Harvey & Shrieves, 2001; Davila & Penalva, 2004) .
Reported earnings are the joint outcome of negotiations between executives and auditors (Antle & Nalebuff, 1991; Gibbins et al., 2001) . Seeking for positive earnings, managers tend to hide income overstatements and protest against income understatements (Antle & Nalebuff, 1991) . To the opposite, auditors prefer conservative accounting choices, namely, the immediate recognition of expenses and the delay of revenues, to avoid potential legal complaints from investors . If there is a conflict between auditors and managers, auditors will offer some revisions to managers. Managers can accept revisions to receive standard reports, reject revisions to receive non-standard opinions, request auditors to perform an extended audit, or dismiss the incumbent auditors. Auditors can either choose to extend the audit or resign from the engagement after perceiving that the risk is too high (Antle & Nalebuff, 1991; Gibbins et al., 2001 ).
The monitoring role of auditors may be impaired because reported earnings may not reliably and relevantly reflect firm performance. First, the degrees of conservatism vary among auditors (Krishnan, 1994; Hackenbrack & Nelson, 1996; . Second, management and auditors have different private information so that auditors are not able to detect income overstatement intentionally hidden by management (Zimbleman & Waller, 1999; Gibbins et al., 2001 ). Third, auditors make compromises to management because they are not independent. The independences of auditors is threatened due to the affiliation of auditors with the client (Menon & Williams, 2004; Lennox, 2005) and non-audit services (Frankel, Johnson, & Nelson, 2002; Chen, Krishnan, & Su, 2002) . Fourth, auditors come up with false conclusion due to the stress of deadlines or changes in auditing standards (Gibbins et al., 2001) .
Before the effectiveness of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, managers have the powers to appoint auditors and the shareholder ratification on auditor selection is not mandatory (Raghunandan, 2003; Raghunandan & Rama, 2003; Krishnan & Ye, 2005) . In fact, even shareholders choose to vote on auditor selection, the percentage of voting against the auditor appointment is very low (Raghunandan & Rama, 2003) (Note 1). Therefore, managers are able to choose auditors who do not function efficiently regarding the monitoring role.
Auditor Changes
Auditor changes are provoked not by management's seek for favorable audit opinions but by auditors' conservative applications of financial standards (Krishnan, 1994) . Since the successor auditor is less conservative than the predecessor auditor, discretionary accruals in the first year after auditor switches are less income decreasing than the prior years .
Hypothesis
The demand for auditing comes from the desire to monitor management shirking if there are information asymmetries between managers and owners (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . Thus auditors act as the external control mechanism to management. However, sometimes auditors do not function well to deter managers' opportunistic behaviors. This phenomenon happens because: 1) some auditors are less conservative about the appropriate application of GAAP (DeFond, 1992 : Krishnan, 1994 Hackenbrack & Nelson, 1996; , 2) new auditors have less private information about the client so that managers are able to hide earnings inflation (Zimbleman & Waller, 1999; Gibbins et al., 2001) , 3) auditors have the economic bond with the client because the client hires former audit staff (Menon & Williams, 2004; Lennox, 2005) or purchase non-audit services (Frankel, Johnson, & Nelson, 2002; Chen, Krishnan, & Su, 2002) . Therefore, if managers are not satisfied with the GAAP treatments of their incumbent auditors, they are inclined to be associated with other auditors who are less conservative, know less about the firm-specific information, or are economically tied to them. They are able to do so because they have the decision power to select auditors and shareholders rarely vote against their decisions (Raghunandan, 2003; Raghunandan & Rama, 2003; Krishnan & Ye, 2005) . Consequently, if the compensation contract is based on accounting measures and the contract structure has not been changed, managers are able to overstate discretionary accruals (DeFond, 1992; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1993; . Consequently, executive compensation is intentionally increased (Gaver, Gaver, & Austin, 1995; Holthausen, Larcker, & Sloan, 1995; Gaver & Gaver, 1998; Balsam, 1998; Bergstresser & Philippon, 2004; etc.) . This leads to the first hypothesis:
H1: Compensation becomes higher after the firm changes the auditor.
However, the relation between compensation and auditor changes varies depending on the public announcement of audit failure, auditor brand names, and types of auditor switches. In the following, I develop specific hypotheses about auditor changes.
Due to the accounting failure of Enron, investors perceive audits of other Arthur Andersen clients to be of lower quality (Chaney & Phillipich, 2002) . Successor auditors of former Andersen clients confront uniquely higher litigation risk and are more conservative about accounting choices. Therefore, abnormal accruals of ex-Anderson companies have significantly dropped after being associated with new auditors (Cahan & Zhang, 2006) . Thus I treat former Anderson clients after the Enron collapse as a special group and expect decreases in compensation for those companies. My first specific hypothesis is:
H1a: The positive relationship between changes in compensation and auditor changes becomes weaker for former Arthur Anderson's clients subsequent to the bankruptcy of Arthur Anderson.
Previous studies suggest that big five accounting firms have better audit quality (Francis & Wilson, 1988; DeFond, 1992; etc.) . Big five auditors are more effective in constraining opportunistic earnings management than non big five auditors, especially when managers desire for income-increasing accrual choices (Francis, Maydew, & Sparks, 1999; Kim, Chung, & Firth, 2003) . The level of discretionary accruals is significantly lower for big five clients than non-big five clients (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam, 1998) . Therefore, changes in compensation vary across the successor auditors based on brand names. If the predecessor is a big five auditor and the successor is a non-big five auditor, management is able to inflate net income to a larger magnitude to be offered higher compensation. Otherwise, if the auditor is changed from a non-big five auditor to a big five auditor, management engages in less opportunistic income-increasing activities. My second detailed hypothesis is:
H1b: The positive relationship between changes in compensation and auditor changes becomes stronger (weaker) if the firm switches its auditor from a big five (non-big five) accounting firm to a non-big five (big five) accounting firm.
The compensation-auditor change relationship also relies on which party initiates the switch. Auditor resignations (auditors initiate the change) are tied to high litigation risk and client financial distress (Krishnan & Krishnan, 1997 ) and a lack of management integrity (Schroeder & Verrault, 1987) . The capital market reacts negatively to the resignations and the successor auditors are more conservative based on the perceived high audit risk (Wells & Loudder, 1997) . Hence management is less likely to manipulate earnings after the firm finds the successor auditor.
Auditor changes due to accounting disagreements have similar properties to those of auditor resignations. Accounting disagreements aroused from auditor changes reveal that reported earnings are manifested to some degree that might be troublesome (Hackenbrack & Hogan, 2002) . Furthermore, disagreements are related to poor www.ccsenet.org/ijef International Journal of Economics and Finance Vol. 6, No. 1; financial condition and stock returns are negative prior to auditor changes (Dhaliwal et al., 1993) . Thus the successor auditor may be more alert and impose stricter monitoring on management behaviors. My third further hypothesis is:
H1c: The positive relationship between changes in compensation and auditor changes becomes weaker for auditor resignations or audit-client accounting disagreements.
Model Specification
I establish the equation of compensation based on audit information after controlling economic condition of the company, industries and years. Thus the function about compensation is the following:
Compensation variables = f (auditor change variables, economic variables, industry dummies, year dummies)
There are two measures of compensation variables: cash compensation (CASHCOMP) and total compensation (TOTALCOMP). Total compensation is overall compensation management has earned while cash compensation captures the current component of total compensation.
According to Core et al. (1999) , economic variables include natural log of sales (SALES), book to market ratio (BM), return on assets (ROA), one-year stock returns (TRS1YR), standard deviation of ROA (SROA) and standard deviation of one-year stock returns (STRS1YR). SALES is the proxy for firm size and complexity. BM represents the investment opportunity set. ROA and TRS1YR measure the firm performance. SROA and STRS1YR control for firm risk.
Initially, to test H1, I use CH as the indicator variable that equals one if the company switches the auditor or equals zero otherwise. The model for testing H1 is: 
Considering H1b, I replace CH with AUD1, AUD2, AUD3. AUD1 codes one for the switch from big five auditors to big five auditors, zero otherwise. AUD2 codes one for the switch from non-big five auditors to big five auditors, zero otherwise. AUD3 codes one for the switch from big five auditors to non-big five auditors, zero otherwise. Thus the intercept term implicitly captures the switch from non-big five auditors to non-big five auditors. The model for testing H1b is specified as follows:
To examine H1c, I apply the indicator variable RESIGN (equaling one if an auditor resign from the engagement), DISMISS (equaling one if an auditor is dismissed by the client), DISAGREE (equaling one if the dismissal is due to an accounting disagreement), or GO (equaling one if the reason for the dismissal is that the predecessor issues a going concern opinion) to the equation. In addition, the dummy variable AA is put into the equation to control the special case of former Arthur Anderson clients. The models for H1c regarding resignations and disagreements become: 
Sample Selection
My initial sample starts from all available compensation data from the database ExecuComp during the period 1993-2004 (note 2). Since previous studies (Balsam, 1998; Gaver et al., 1995; Holthausen et al., 1995; Gaver et al., 1998) focus on CEO compensation to examine the association of executive compensation with discretionary accounting choices, I also use CEO compensation as the dependent variable. The usage of CEO compensation is optimal because CEOs are ultimately responsible for firm performance and CEOs usually make the decision to manipulate earnings (Gaver et al., 1998) . All financial information and information to calculate one-year stock returns is collected from Compustat. Information about auditor names is also gathered from Compustat. Information about types of auditor changes (resignations, dismissals due to accounting disagreements and dismissals due to going concern opinions), and going concern opinions is collected from Audit Analytics. the absolute value of student's t score is larger than 2. For the regressions of getting residuals from cash / total compensation, I winsorize deflated value of changes in cash / total compensation at the top and bottom 1%. (16) is much fewer than number of dismissals (437). Number of disagreement-induced dismissals (9) and number of going-concern-induced dismissals (5) ***, **, * Coefficient is significant at the one percent level, the five percent level, the ten percent level respectively (one-tailed where signs are predicted, two-tailed otherwise).
Frequency Analysis
Descriptive Statistics
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International Journal of Economics and Finance Vol. 6, No. 1; Core et al. (1993) since Core et al. (1993) find that SALES, BM, TRS1YR and SROA have the explanatory power. In the regression for equation 1, CH has the positive coefficient of 0.036 that is significant at the 10% level (t-statistics = 1.68). This supports H1 that the occurrence of auditor changes increases CEO compensation. In particular, cash compensation of a CEO is approximately 4% (exp(0.036) -1) higher after switching the auditor. In the regression for Equation 2, none of coefficients on AA and NOTAA is significant, indicating that there is no difference in cash compensation whether the CEO works for a former Anderson client or not. Thus H1a is not supported. In the regression for Equation 3, among three indicator variables of AUD1, AUD2 and AUD3, only coefficient on AUD3 is positive and significant at the 1% percent level (0.254, t-statistics = 2.94). This confirms H1b and implies that the change from big 5 auditors to non-big 5 auditors actually produces the positive association of cash compensation with auditor changes. Specifically, the switches from big 5 auditors to non-big 5 auditors increase cash compensation by almost 30% (exp(0.254) -1).
Panel B shows results for regressions whose dependent variable is natural log of total compensation. For all three equations, all financial and stock market variables (SALES, BM, ROA, TRS1YR, SROA and STRS1YR) have significant coefficients. The results are even stronger than those of Core et al. (1993) . The exception from results of Core et al. (1993) is that the coefficient on BM is negative. , AUD2 has the negative and significant coefficient. This indicates that the switch from a non-big 5 auditor to a big 5 auditor decreases total compensation. Actually total compensation is reduced by about 40% (1 -exp(-0.514)) after the switch. The result also supports H1b because the negative relationship between total compensation and the non-big-5-to-big-5 auditor changes is the extreme case to dampen the positive association of compensation with auditor changes. ***, **, * Coefficient is significant at the one percent level, the five percent level, the ten percent level respectively (one-tailed where signs are predicted, two-tailed otherwise). 
Conclusions
This study investigates the ability of auditors when auditors function as the outside control mechanism to monitor management opportunistic behaviors. I examine the efficiency of auditors' monitoring role through variations of CEO compensation when there are changes in auditors during the sample period 1993-2004. Due to data limitation, the sample period is restricted to 2000-2004 when I explore impacts of specific auditor changes (resignations and accounting disagreements).
The frequency analysis shows that most companies do not want to switch auditors. Auditors are also reluctant to resign from the engagement or file accounting disagreements to the public. However, due to the bankruptcy of Arthur Anderson, in 2002 there is a large number of mandatory auditor switches, especially the switches from Arthur Anderson to other big 5 auditors. The multivariate analysis about auditor switches implies that in general, auditors are not the good external control mechanism to deter opportunistic behaviors of management to overstate earnings. After auditor switches, especially the switches from big 5 auditors to non-big 5 auditors, CEOs are able to manipulate earnings to receive higher compensation. In particular, CEO cash compensation is 30% higher after companies change auditors from big 5 auditors to non-big 5 auditors. However, since big 5 auditors impose stricter requirements on clients than non-big 5 auditors, CEOs have fewer opportunities to manipulate earnings and thus receive 40% less total compensation after switching auditors from non-big 5 auditors to big 5 auditors.
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International Journal of Economics and Finance Vol. 6, No. 1; auditors after 2001 is different from reasons of other auditor switches based on auditor names.
Appendix
Appendix 1. Definition of variables CASHCOMP t = Natural log of cash compensation (salary and bonus) of the CEO in year t TOTALCOMP t = Natural log of total compensation (including salary, bonus, other annual compensation, all other total compensation with option grants) of the CEO in year t MIX t = The ratio of current incentive compensation to total compensation R1 t = Residual from the regression of cash compensation (deflated by total assets) in year t on sales (deflated by total assets) in year t-1, BM t-1, ROA t-1, TRS1YR t-1, SROA t-1, and STRS1YR t-1 R2 t = Residual from the regression of total compensation (deflated by total assets) in year t on sales (deflated by total assets) in year t-1, BM t-1, ROA t-1, TRS1YR t-1, SROA t-1, and STRS1YR t-1 CH t-1 = 1 if the company switches the auditor in year t-1 and 0 otherwise CHPMDA t = Changes in performance-matched discretionary accruals in year t, deflated by total assets in year t
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